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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In September 2008, four events pushed the U.S. financial system 
to the verge of collapse: (1) the federal government took control over 
home mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac;1 (2) wealth 
management company Merrill Lynch agreed to sell itself to Bank of 
America for a fraction of its stock trading price when its liquidity 
dissolved in a single day;2 (3) global financial services firm Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy;3 and (4) multinational insurance 
corporation, American International Group (AIG), faced collapse, 
prompting the federal government to loan the insurance giant eighty-
five billion dollars.4  At the close of 2008, Wall Street finished its worst 
year since the 1930s, and the housing market finished its worst year in 
recorded history.5  It took huge taxpayer-financed bail outs to repair 
the American market.6  Despite efforts to stop the turmoil, the 2008 
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 1  David Ellis, U.S. Seizes Fannie and Freddie, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7, 2008, 8:28 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fannie_freddie/. 
 2  Matthew Karnitschnig et al., Bank of America to Buy Merrill, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 
2008, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122142278543033525.html. 
 3  Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is Sold, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 4  Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/ 
17insure.html?pagewanted=all.  
 5  MARK ZANDI, FROM FINANCIAL CRISIS TO RECOVERY 7 (2012) (discussing how, 
collectively, “a string of financial policy errors beginning with the government takeover 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the collective decision of the Bush 
Administration and the Federal Reserve to allow Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt . . . 
turned a serious yet manageable financial crisis into an out-of-control financial panic” 
and leading to “the worst economic global downturn since the 1930’s Great 
Depression”). 
 6  The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), 
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crisis resulted in the largest depression this country has seen since the 
stock market crash of 1929, and today we are still feeling the effects of 
the 2008 recession.7 
In response to the financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank,” “Dodd-Frank Act,” or “the Act”) on July 21, 2010.8  The goals 
of the Act, as summarized in the preamble, are “[t]o promote the 
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect 
the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”9 
One specific goal of Dodd-Frank is to encourage whistleblowers 
to report securities law violations.10  The Act provides monetary awards 
to incentivize employees to report violations  and protects employees 
who do come forward by shielding them from any employer retaliation 
that may arise in response to their whistleblowing.11  It is not clear, 
however, who qualifies as a whistleblower under the statute, leaving 
potential tipsters uncertain of whether or not they will be eligible for 
Dodd-Frank’s protection from employer retaliation if they choose to 
report a violation.  The ambiguity stems from two conflicting 
provisions: the “Definitions” section of the Act, which specifically 
defines a whistleblower as an individual who reports a violation directly 
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or “the 
Commission”);12 and the “Protection of Whistleblowers” provision (the 
“Anti-Retaliation provision”), which prohibits employer retaliation 
against “whistleblowers” that report either internally or to an agency 
 
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-
still-being-felt-five-years-article (“September 2008 almost brought down the world’s 
financial system. It took huge taxpayer-financed bail-outs to shore up the industry.”).   
 7  See, e.g., Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the 
Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 11 (2009) (“[T]he global economic slowdown 
is not like the most recent slowdowns seen in 2001, 1998, or 1987, but is, rather, quite 
comparable to the period after the debilitating 1929 stock market crash known as the 
Great Depression.”).  
 8  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 
22, 26, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 9  Preamble, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 10  Dave Ebersole, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 
6  BUS. L.J. 123, 124 (2011) (“Dodd-Frank is designed to incentivize whistleblowers to 
expose securities fraud.”). 
 11  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2015). 
 12  § 78u-6(a)(6) (“The term ‘whistleblower’ means any individual who provides . . . 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a 
manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”). 
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other than the SEC.13  The clashing provisions leave employers, 
potential whistleblowers, and courts with the unresolved question: 
does Dodd-Frank require employees to report directly to the SEC 
before they are eligible for whistleblower protection under the Act, or 
will internal reporting suffice? 
Several courts have considered this issue, and their rulings fall on 
both sides of the debate.14  To further complicate matters, the SEC has 
expressed its own opinion through regulation and amicus briefs that 
an employee who raises complaints of potential violations internally, 
perhaps to a supervisor or compliance department, falls within the 
Act’s whistleblower protection.15  Yet the SEC’s guidance has proven 
ineffective and, arguably, has only further complicated the matter.  
Several jurisdictions declined to follow the SEC’s broad interpretation 
and even questioned the SEC’s authority to regulate on the issue,16 
leaving potential whistleblowers in these jurisdictions with conflicting 
advice about their protection under Dodd-Frank. 
It is imperative to Dodd-Frank’s success that either the courts or 
legislature clarify which employees are eligible for whistleblower anti-
retaliation protections under the Act.  Raising a complaint exposes the 
reporting employee to various personal and professional risks.  
Generally, there are two unfavorable consequences that deter 
employees from reporting violations.  The first is the risk of social 
pressures from colleagues who consider whistleblowers “snitches.”17  
Second is the risk of employer backlash, such as being passed over for 
a promotion, being demoted, or even being terminated.18  These risks 
stem from the fact that employers and employees are in an unequal 
power relationship, and “most employers move to isolate, humiliate 
and terminate any employee who questions the legality of their . . . 
 
 13  § 78u-6(h)(1). 
 14  Compare Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(concluding that the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower protection provision, only protects those individuals “who provide 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC”), with Rosenblum 
v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.), LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(holding that an individual reporting securities laws violations internally will fall under 
the whistle-blower protections of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)).  
 15  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (2013); see also Brief for the SEC, Amicus Curiae in 
Support of the Appellant, Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, No. 13 Civ. 317 (WHP), 2013 
WL 5692504 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2014/ 
liu-siemens-0214.pdf [hereinafter SEC, Amicus Brief]. 
 16  See infra Part III.C.   
 17  Frances J. Milliken et al., An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that 
Employees Don’t Communicate Upward and Why, 40 J. MGT. STUD. 1453, 1454 (2003).  
 18  Id. 
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practices.”19  An incident experienced by Patrick Burns, Co-Director of 
the non-profit organization Taxpayers Against Fraud, adequately 
summarizes employer sentiment towards whistleblowers:  “I once asked 
a room full of compliance officers if their company had ever made an 
internal whistleblower ‘employee of the month’ or given them a raise.  
The room burst out laughing.”20 
Without assurance that Dodd-Frank will protect tipsters from 
employer retaliation, it is doubtful that employees will risk their jobs 
and reputations by raising complaints.  “Most potential internal 
whistleblowers, including executive-level ones, will not jeopardize their 
careers without an absolute guarantee of anonymity . . . .”21  An 
assurance of anonymity and Dodd-Frank’s strong anti-retaliation 
protections, however, can ameliorate many of the social and 
professional risks associated with reporting and encourage tipsters to 
come forward.22 
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of pre-Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower laws and discusses the importance of whistleblowers in 
maintaining corporate integrity.  Part III analyzes Dodd-Frank’s 
whistleblower provision and discusses how previous whistleblower law 
shaped the provision.  Part IV provides a summary of the conflicting 
interpretations of the Anti-Retaliation statute, and Part V discusses how 
the statute’s ambiguity can be resolved by using the Chevron test to 
ultimately defer to the SEC’s regulations.  Part VI concludes. 
II. WHISTLEBLOWER LAW BEFORE DODD-FRANK 
Whistleblowing occurs when an employee discloses wrongdoing 
on the part of his corporation or organization.23  Whistleblowing may 
occur internally, when an employee contacts a manager or a 
supervisor, or externally, when an employee reports such behavior to 
a government agency or media representative.24  As employees within 
the company that they report, whistleblowers possess knowledge that 
shareholders and the public would otherwise not uncover and are 
therefore crucial to detecting corporate fraud.  According to a 2010 
 
 19  Nicholas Feeney & Patrick Burns, Three Whistleblower Stories, TAXPAYERS AGAINST 
FRAUD EDUC. FUND (July 24, 2012), https://www.taf.org/blog/three-whistleblower-
stories.  
 20  FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, WHISTLEBLOWERS: INCENTIVES, DISINCENTIVES, AND 
PROTECTION STRATEGIES 1 (2011).   
 21  Id.   
 22  Id.  
 23  Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: A 
Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 548 (2004).  
 24  Id.  
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study conducted by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE), “[whistleblower] tips account for more than 40 percent of 
reported instances of occupational fraud.”25  The ACFE’s 2010 study 
also concludes that tips are “more effective in detecting occupational 
fraud than the collective total of management review, internal audit 
and external audit.”26  Absent reporting by internal whistleblowers, 
“future incidents of massive corporate wrongdoing, along the lines of 
the Enron scandal or the Bernard Madoff ponzi scheme might never 
be revealed, or might have been revealed too late.”27 
The federal government has long recognized the value of a 
whistleblower’s unique position and his power to maintain corporate 
integrity,28 and has continuously tried to incentivize whistleblowers to 
come forward through monetary awards and retaliation protections for 
reporting information to government agencies.29  Despite these efforts, 
very few whistleblowers had come forward to report violations,30 
perhaps due to the negative treatment whistleblowers tend to face after 
raising claims.31  Further, even if a whistleblower leaves his company, 
the negative reputation attached to the whistleblower label follows and 
may hurt the employee’s chances of securing another job.32 
While our society still attaches many negative stigmas to 
whistleblowers, several recent corporate scandals have instigated a shift 
 
 25  LIPMAN, supra note 20, at 2.   
 26  Id.  According to a 2010 study, employee tips are the leading method of 
detecting securities laws violations, accounting for 40.2% of all cases.  Id.  The second 
most effective of detecting securities laws violations is management review, only 
accounting for 15.4% of all cases.  Id.   
 27  Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy 
Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 637, 668 (2010). 
 28  Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of 
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1904 (2007).  The origins of 
whistleblowing legislation in the United States can be traced to the False Claims Act, 
enacted in 1863 to reduce the incidences of fraud among the suppliers of munitions 
and other war materials to the Union government during the Civil War.  Id.; see also 
Umang Desai, Comment, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 436 (2012) (“Congress has demonstrated its belief that 
employees and other insiders are in a unique position to uncover fraud . . . .”). 
 29  Desai, supra note 28, at 440.  
 30  Id. at 437.  
 31  Id. at 437 (“Employee complaints are often diluted or dismissed by 
management, and after a claim has been made, many employees are subjected to 
various forms of retaliation,” such as workplace harassment or termination.).  See 
generally Jisoo Kim, Confessions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform 
the Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 249 
(2009).  
 32  Kim, supra note 31.   
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in perspective towards acceptance of and even praise for 
whistleblowers33: “whistleblowing as a means to police corporate 
misconduct is gaining support.”34  Public disdain for whistleblowers 
undoubtedly hindered any past whistleblower incentive programs.  
Perhaps this shift in perspective will allow Dodd-Frank to succeed 
where its predecessors did not. 
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 1934 
Act”) to regulate the secondary securities markets in response to the 
infamous stock market crash of 1929.35  The 1934 Act created the SEC, 
a federal administrative agency formed to oversee these markets.36  
Prior to Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the 1934 Act, the SEC could 
reward only whistleblowers involved in insider-trading cases.  The SEC 
has discretion to award whistleblowers a percentage of the amount 
recovered from violators of the Act.  That recovery amount, however, 
maxes out at ten percent of the total penalty imposed on the violator, 
and many whistleblowers receive significantly less than ten percent of 
the penalty amount, if they receive any reward at all.37  The SEC retains 
unrestricted discretion in determining whether or not to grant a 
reward, and many whistleblowers do not receive any money for their 
reports.38 
Unsurprisingly, the “relatively small financial reward combined 
with the discretionary authority of the SEC to reward the 
whistleblower” has rendered the 1934 Act an ineffective means of 
uncovering insider-trading or other securities violations.39  Since the 
statute has been in effect, only five whistleblowers have received 
 
 33  Macey, supra note 28, at 1901–02 (attributing the newfound praise for 
whistleblowers to the Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom scandals, and even to movies 
like The Insider).  
 34  Peter J. Henning, Tattletales Embraced as Whistle-Blower Program Gain Support, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK, (Dec. 1, 2014, 9:38 AM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2014/12/01/tattletales-embraced-as-whistle-blower-programs-gain-support/? 
module=BlogPost-Title.  
 35  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2015)). 
 36  15 U.S.C. § 78(d).   
 37  § 78u-6. 
 38  Sarah Johnson, Paid to Whistle, CFO (July 23, 2010), http://ww2.cfo.com/risk-
compliance/2010/07/paid-to-whistle/. 
 39  Lucienne M. Hartmann, Comment, Whistle While You Work: The Fairytale-Like 
Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of ‘Greedy,’ the Eighth Dwarf, 
62 MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1282 (2011).  
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awards, and those awards totaled a mere $159,537.40 
B. The False Claims Act 
In 1986, Congress drastically changed the structure of 
whistleblower law by expanding the scope of the False Claims Act 
(FCA) to prevent the false submission of claims for the payment of 
government contracts.41  The FCA allows a private individual, with 
knowledge of past or present fraud committed on the federal 
government, to sue on the government’s behalf and recover a portion 
of any damage award.42  Awards for whistleblowers under the FCA are 
mandatory and range from fifteen to thirty percent of any money that 
the government receives from the violator.43  
The 1986 amendment radically increased FCA compliance and 
enforcement.44  Prior to the 1986 amendment, less than ten percent of 
FCA claims were initiated by whistleblowers.45  By 2011, however, 
eighty-five percent of the FCA claims investigated by the government 
or prosecuted were initiated by whistleblowers.  In that year alone, the 
government reclaimed more than $3 billion, with roughly $530 million 
of that amount going to the whistleblowers that instigated these 
actions.46 
The success of the FCA underscores how crucial whistleblowers 
are in uncovering corporate fraud and illegal business practices.  It also 
highlights that money talks, and if the government wants 
whistleblowers to come forward, it will need to incentivize them with 
offers of a substantial percentage of the recovery.  Although the FCA 
improved previous whistleblower law with the promise of stronger 
rewards, the FCA lacks a whistleblower protection provision and leaves 
tipsters vulnerable to any employer retaliation that may occur as a 
result of whistleblowing. 
 
 40  Johnson, supra note 38.  
 41  False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2015)). 
 42  31 U.S.C. § 3729–33. 
 43  § 3730(d)(1); see generally Robert R. Stauffer & Andrew D. Kennedy, Dodd-Frank 
Act Promises Large Bounties for Whistleblowers, LAW.COM, Aug. 23, 2010, at 1, 
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/270/original/Law.comDoddFrankA
rticle.pdf?1318891008.  
 44  Stauffer & Kennedy, supra note 43. 
 45  Age Of The Whistleblower: Incentives And Protections, LAW360 (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/375370/age-of-the-whistleblower-incentives-and-
protections. 
 46  Id.  
PELLINO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2016  12:48 PM 
918 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:911 
C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
In 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
following several corporate scandals, such as Enron and Worldcom, in 
which numerous multinational corporations became victims of 
corporate fraud.  These corporate scandals ultimately cost investors 
billions of dollars, sending many of these investors and corporations 
into insolvency.47  SOX expanded upon previous whistleblower laws by 
expressly protecting whistleblowers from employer retaliation, a 
feature lacking in previous whistleblower statutes.  Unlike the 1934 Act 
and FCA, SOX protects whistleblowers from employer retaliation after 
reporting violations and also extends whistleblower protection beyond 
federal employees to employees of publicly held companies.48 
The relevant provisions within SOX addressing whistleblower 
protection are Section 301 and Section 806.  Section 301 creates an 
employee reporting system designed to catch instances of corporate 
fraud.49  Section 806 imposes both civil and criminal liability on 
companies that take retaliatory actions against whistleblowers and 
entitles these whistleblowers to reinstatement or some other form of 
recourse.50  Section 806 also penalizes corporations that fail to address 
fraud and/or punish the whistleblower that exposed the violations.51 
Unfortunately, SOX has not been as successful as expected in 
bringing tipsters forward with reports of violations.  SOX’s 
whistleblower protections have a number of loopholes, and its shield 
has been characterized as “narrow in scope and more illusory than 
real.”52  In fact, “after SOX was introduced, the percentage of 
whistleblowers . . . actually dropped from 18.4% to 13.2%.”53  The 
statute is procedurally complex and provides no punitive damages in 
civil actions by whistleblowers, meaning that a terminated 
whistleblower’s only likely victory would be an award of back pay and 
attorney’s fees.54  The turnaround between witnessing the violation and 
 
 47  Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C. (2012))  
 48  Hartmann, supra note 39, at 1285–86.  
 49  15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4).  
 50  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a), (c) (2012). 
 51  Id. 
 52  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Article, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform 
Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 B.Y.U.L. REV. 73, 
83 (2012) (quoting Deborah L. Seifert et al., The Influence of Organizational Justice on 
Accountant Whistleblowing, 35 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC. 707, 709 (2010)).  
 53  Samuel C. Leifer, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the Dodd-Frank Act, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 121, 128 (2014).  
 54  Id. at 129.  
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reporting the violation must also be quick, as SOX restricts tipsters to 
a ninety-day statute of limitations from the date of the violation.  
Further, there is no right to a jury trial under SOX for those 
whistleblowers bringing claims in federal court.55 
III. CURRENT WHISTLEBLOWER LAW UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
Section 922(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act adds a new section to the 
1934 Act,56 which expands previous whistleblower laws in two ways: (1) 
it increases whistleblowers’ financial incentive to report by requiring 
the SEC to award bounties to persons who provide useful information 
to the SEC regarding securities law violations;57 and (2) it strengthens 
retaliation protections for whistleblowers who provide such 
information.58  In passing the Act, Congress sought to encourage 
employees to report information related to potential violations of the 
securities laws to the Commission.59 
The bounty program under Dodd-Frank is a major improvement 
from SOX.60  While SOX improved whistleblower protection from 
employer retaliation, there was no “financial incentive for 
whistleblowers or informants.”61  SOX “screams out for a bounty 
program,” given its “exceedingly weak” anti-retaliation provision, the 
massive potential for fraud not likely to otherwise be detected by 
regulators, and the ability to tie the value of a bounty to the level of 
fraud revealed by a whistleblower.62  The payment of a bounty is 
mandatory under Dodd-Frank.  That Act stipulates that the SEC “shall 
pay an award” of ten to thirty percent of the collected monetary 
sanctions resulting from “successful enforcement” actions.63  The SEC 
has discretion to determine the amount of the award, although the law 
provides some guidance, urging the SEC to consider factors such as 
the significance of the information provided, the degree of assistance 
 
 55  Rapp, supra note 52.  
 56  NORRIS MCLAUGHLIN & MARCUS, P.A., NEW WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND 
PROTECTION IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT 2 (2010), http://www.nmmlaw.com/pdf/ 
Whistleblower%20Dodd%20Frank%20Act.pdf. 
 57  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2012). 
 58  § 78u-6(h). 
 59  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010). 
 60  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h). 
 61  M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Deja Vu All Over Again:” Using Bounty Hunters to Leverage 
Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REV. 419, 460 (2010).  
 62  Rapp, supra note 52, at 85 (quoting Jarod Spencer Gonzalez, A Pot of Gold at the 
End of the Rainbow: An Economic Incentives-Based Approach to OSHA Whistleblowing, 14 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 325, 346 (2010)). 
 63  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b).  
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the whistleblower provides, and the “programmatic interest” of the 
SEC in “deterring violations of the securities laws by making awards to 
whistleblowers.”64  
Dodd-Frank expands SOX in several other respects as well, such 
as increasing the statute of limitations period for reporting violations.  
Under Dodd-Frank, tipsters who are discriminated against or fired in 
response to their whistleblowing have a six-year statute of limitations 
to bring their case to a federal judge, and the limitations period begins 
with “the date on which the employee became aware of the violation”65 
rather than the date the violation occurred.66  Dodd-Frank also 
expands protection to employees in private subsidiaries and affiliates 
of public companies and gives SOX whistleblowers an express right to 
a jury trial in retaliation cases.67 
A. Who is a Whistleblower Under Dodd-Frank? 
Dodd-Frank defines a whistleblower under the Act as “any 
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who 
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
Commission.”68  At first glance, this definition suggests that a 
whistleblower must report violations directly to the SEC in order for 
Dodd-Frank to shield him from employer retaliation.  A protected 
“whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank is one who reports securities laws 
violations “to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or 
regulation, by the Commission.”69  This provision, however, cannot be 
fully understood without considering subsection (iii) of 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-6(h)(1)(A), Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation provision, which 
specifies the ways in which the Act protects whistleblowers from their 
employers.  The Act provides: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, 
harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner 
discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and 
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by 
the whistleblower- 
(i) in providing information to the Commission in 
accordance with this section; 
 
 64  Id. 
 65  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2012).  
 66  See Leifer, supra note 53, at 129. 
 67  Rapp, supra note 52, at 73. 
 68  15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6). 
 69   Id. (emphasis added).  
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(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any 
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the 
Commission based upon or related to such information; 
or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . , 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . , including 
section 10A(m) of such Act . . . , and any other law, rule, 
or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission.70 
Subsections (i) and (ii) undoubtedly protect whistleblowers who 
report potentially illegal activity to the SEC, or employees that work 
with the SEC, in some manner, concerning potential securities 
violations.  The confusion over who qualifies as a whistleblower under 
Dodd-Frank stems from subsection (iii) of the Anti-Retaliation 
provision.  This subsection indicates that a whistleblower reporting 
securities violations internally, and not to the SEC, still falls within the 
scope of Dodd-Frank as long as he would otherwise be protected under 
SOX, the 1934 Act, or any other law, rule, or regulation within the 
SEC’s jurisdiction. 
Subsection (iii) seems inconsistent with the definition of a 
whistleblower because many laws, rules and regulations within the 
SEC’s jurisdiction do not require any interaction with the SEC 
whatsoever.71  SOX, for example, affords whistleblower protection to 
an employee who gives “information or assistance” to “a person with 
supervisory authority over the employee.”72  Hypothetically, if an 
employee reports activity violating SOX to a supervisor and does not 
contact the SEC, Dodd-Frank would protect that whistleblower from 
employer harassment or retaliation.  If, under the Act, a whistleblower 
is strictly an individual who reports a violation to the SEC, why also 
include protections for employees that report either internally or to 
other agencies? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70  § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).  
 71  Rapp, supra note 52, at 74. 
 72  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1), (1)(C) (2012).  
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B. The SEC’s Interpretation of Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provision 
Recognizing the potential conflict, the SEC attempted to settle 
the issue through regulation.  The SEC argues that its Rule 21F-2(b)(1) 
reasonably resolves this tension because it “ensur[es] that individuals 
who report internally first will not be potentially disadvantaged by 
losing employment anti-retaliation protection.”73  In its final 
regulations adopted on May 25, 2011, the SEC took the position that a 
whistleblower need not make a disclosure to the SEC to be protected 
under Dodd-Frank.74  The regulations, in relevant part, provide that: 
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded 
by . . . 78u-6(h)(1), you are a whistleblower if: 
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information 
you are providing relates to a possible securities law 
violation . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about 
to occur, and; 
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described 
in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78u-6(h)(1)(A)).75 
The SEC regulations, however, have not resolved the issue.  If 
anything, the regulations have further confused the matter by 
introducing the new question: does the SEC have the authority to 
define “whistleblower” in the context of Dodd-Frank?76 
In February 2014, the SEC filed an amicus brief with the Second 
Circuit in Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens, encouraging the court to rule on the 
scope of whistleblower protection and to adopt the SEC’s rule-making 
authority.77  In Meng-Lin Liu, the plaintiff, a Taiwanese resident and 
compliance officer for Siemens China, was terminated shortly after 
internally reporting concerns about an alleged kickback scheme in the 
company’s healthcare division.78  Liu filed suit in the District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, claiming protection as a 
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation provision and 
arguing that the Anti-Retaliation provision does not explicitly require 
external reporting to the SEC.79 
 
 
 73  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2013). 
 74  Id.  
 75  Id.  
 76  Henning, supra note 34.  Under Chevron, courts should defer to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.  The SEC’s interpretation should 
prevail if the statute is unclear.  Id. 
 77  SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 39. 
 78  Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 79  Id. 
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In its amicus brief, the SEC argued that the statutory language of 
Dodd-Frank does not unambiguously indicate whether individuals 
must report directly to the SEC to come within the Act’s 
protection.80  As long as there is ambiguity in the statute, the SEC 
argued, it is permissible for the SEC to adopt a reasonable 
interpretation.  The SEC also maintained that its interpretation of 
Dodd-Frank is consistent with congressional policy to encourage, and 
in some instances require, internal reporting of potential misconduct 
under federal securities laws, especially SOX.  Finally, the SEC urged 
that the narrow interpretation, if adopted, “would significantly weaken 
the deterrence effect on employers who might otherwise consider 
taking an adverse employment action.”81  The court ultimately 
dismissed the case based on unrelated deficiencies in the plaintiff’s 
claim and skirted the issue of whether or not internal whistleblowers 
are protected under Dodd-Frank.82 
In December 2014, the SEC filed a second amicus brief with the 
Third Circuit in support of the plaintiff in Safarian v. American DG 
Energy Inc.,83 reiterating its argument that the statute is ambiguous and 
urging the court to endorse the agency’s definition of “whistleblower” 
as including individuals who only report internally.  The SEC again 
argued that the protection afforded by clause (iii) “reaches beyond just 
disclosures involving securities law violations and disclosures to the 
Commission.”84 
C. Case Law Interpreting Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provision 
Several district courts have acknowledged the conflict between 
the plain terms of the Dodd-Frank Act’s definition of 
“whistleblower”—one who provides information “to the 
Commission”—and the Anti-Retaliation provision, which protects an 
individual who makes disclosures “required or protected” under any 
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.  
The cases decided thus far fall on one of two sides: either 
whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank are only those individuals who 
 
 80  SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 12. 
 81  Id. at 30.  
 82  Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens AG, 978 F. Supp. 2d 325, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 83  No. CIV. 10-6082, 2014 WL 1744989 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, remanded, 622 F. App’x 149 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 84  Brief for SEC as Amici Curiae in Support of the Appellant, at 29, Safarian v. Am. 
DG Energy Inc., No. CIV. 10-6082, 2014 WL 1744989 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, remanded, 622 F. App’x 149 (3d Cir. 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2014/safarian-americandg.pdf [hereinafter 
SEC, Amicus Brief II]. 
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report directly to the SEC and Dodd-Frank’s protection does not 
extend to employees who report violations internally; or Dodd-Frank 
should be interpreted broadly to encompass whistleblowers who report 
violations internally.85  Of the courts that have considered the issue, an 
overwhelming majority side with the SEC and interpret the statute 
broadly to protect both external and internal whistleblowers.86  Not all 
of these courts, however, reach this conclusion in the same manner; a 
number of courts used the basic tools of statutory construction while 
others simply deferred to the SEC’s interpretation.87 
i. A Majority of Courts Agree That the Statute is 
Ambiguous and Defer to the SEC’s Reasonable 
Interpretation Using the Chevron Test 
Many courts considering the issue find the text of Dodd-Frank to 
be ambiguous with regard to its whistleblower definition and defer to 
the SEC.  The Southern District of New York, for instance, ruled 
in Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters LLC that the whistleblower 
requirements are ambiguous under Dodd-Frank, and the court should 
thus respect the SEC’s determination that reporting to the SEC is not 
required in order for an individual to qualify as a whistleblower.88 
The plaintiff in Rosenblum who sold financial products for 
Thomson Reuters, witnessed a company practice that violated insider-
trading rules.  Rosenblum reported the illegal behavior to two 
Thomson Reuters supervisors.89  The two supervisors dismissed his 
concern, prompting Rosenblum to contact both the Federal Bureau of 
 
 85  See Mystica M. Alexander, Defining the Whistleblower Under Dodd-Frank: Who 
Decides?, 5 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 278, 281–82 (2014), 
http://www.californialawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/ALEXANDER_27
8.pdf.  
 86  Id. at 281.  
 87  Compare Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 729–30 (D. Neb. 
2014) (independently adopting SEC’s view based on statutory language of the Act), 
Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying the 
Chevron test and ultimately deferring to SEC’s regulation to hold that internal 
reporting is protected conduct), Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.), LLC, 984 F. 
Supp. 2d 141, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (declining to follow Asadi and finding ambiguity 
in the conflict between Definitions section and Anti-Retaliation provision), and 
Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013) (“This court 
respectfully disagrees and instead adopts the SEC’s interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of Dodd-Frank.”), with Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 
623 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plain language of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower 
protection provision creates a private cause of action only for individuals who provide 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to SEC). 
 88  Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147–48. 
 89  Id. at 144. 
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Investigation and the Thomson Reuters Ethics Committee.  Shortly 
after these events, Thomson Reuters fired Rosenblum.  Rosenblum 
brought a claim against Thomson Reuters, alleging protection from 
retaliation under the whistleblower protection provision of Dodd-
Frank.  Defendants challenged Rosenblum’s whistleblower status, 
arguing that because Rosenblum had failed to report information 
directly to the SEC, he did not qualify under the Dodd-Frank definition 
of a whistleblower.90  
The court determined that the statute was ambiguous and applied 
the two-part test established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.91  The Chevron test, as the court explained, requires 
the following: 
The first step inquires whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is 
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress. However, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the court applies 
step two—whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute. If the agency 
interpretation is reasonable, then [a court] must defer to it.92 
Applying the two-step test, the court acknowledged that “the governing 
statute is ambiguous” and found it “appropriate to consider the SEC’s 
interpretation of the statute.”93 
Several months later, the District Court of New Jersey also 
deferred to the SEC’s definition of a whistleblower.  In Khazin v. TD 
Ameritrade Holding Corp., the plaintiff was terminated after reporting 
improper pricing of certain financial products to his supervisor, 
prompting him to bring a claim under the whistleblower protection 
provision of Dodd-Frank.94  The Court applied the Chevron test, 
reasoning: “if the statute is ambiguous and the Congressional intent 
underlying the statute is unclear, courts look to the agency’s 
construction of the statute for guidance.”95  The court noted the 
obvious conflict and ambiguity in the statute and deferred to the SEC’s 
 
 90  Id. at 148. 
 91  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 92  See Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 93  Id. at 147–48.  
 94  Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW)(MCA), 2014 WL 
940703, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014). 
 95  Id. at *4. 
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interpretation.96 
In September 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, reversed the decision of the district court 
below and held that “the [whistleblower] provisions of Dodd-Frank 
create a sufficient ambiguity to warrant our deference to the SEC’s 
interpretive rule.”97  In Berman, the plaintiff alleged that he reported to 
his employer, but not to the SEC, a number of transactions that he 
reasonably believed to be violations of “policy, law, and GAAP,” “WPP 
policies,” and “Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank and U.S. Securities 
Laws.”98  Plaintiff also claimed that his employer fired him after raising 
complaints in violation of Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation provision for 
whistleblowers.99  The Southern District of New York declined to follow 
the prior case law of its own jurisdiction and instead followed the 
minority position outlined in Asadi, concluding that the employee was 
not a “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank.100 
The split within the district itself was, however, short-lived.  On 
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the decision below and held that 
the definition of a whistleblower is ambiguous under the statute, thus 
it was appropriate to defer to the SEC’s reasonable interpretation using 
the Chevron test.101  In so holding, the court was not persuaded by the 
argument that reading the text in a way to protect internal 
whistleblowers would render certain parts of the statute “superfluous;” 
instead, the court noted that the additional language was just one of 
the “realities of the legislative process.”102  Pointing out that the Anti-
Retaliation provisions were “added at the last minute,” the court 
reasoned: “it is not at all surprising that no one noticed that the new 
subdivision and the definition of ‘whistleblower’ do not fit together 
neatly.”103  Further, the court reasoned that it “need not definitively 
construe the statute, because . . . the tension between the 
 
 96  Id. at *6. 
 97  Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 98  Id. at 149. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id.  The district court below reasoned that “[a]pplying the standard canons of 
statutory construction, one would expect that the defined term would have the same 
meaning in the anti-retaliation provisions of the Act as it does elsewhere in the statute.”  
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d and 
remanded, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).  The district court further reasoned that this 
reading makes sense in the context of the financial bounty provisions of the Act, 
noting, “it is hard to imagine how the Commission would pay a financial award to a 
whistleblower who never reported information to the Commission.”  Id. 
 101  Berman, 801 F.3d at 154–55. 
 102  Id. at 154. 
 103  Id. at 154–55.  
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definition in subsection 21F(a)(6) and the limited protection provided 
by subdivision (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) . . . [is] sufficiently 
ambiguous to oblige us to give Chevron deference to the reasonable 
interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute.”104 
ii. Other Courts Find That the Text of Dodd-Frank 
Unambiguously Supports a Definition of 
Whistleblower That Includes Internal Reporting 
Other courts have relied solely on the text of Dodd-Frank to hold 
that a whistleblower does not need to report to the SEC under the Act 
by carving out a narrow exception to the definition of whistleblower 
specifically for the Anti-Retaliation provision.105  In Ellington v. 
Giacoumakis, the plaintiff brought suit against his former employer, 
defendant New England Investment & Retirement Group, Inc. 
(NEINV), alleging a termination of his employment in violation of the 
whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act after he reported 
securities laws violations to a NEINV compliance officer.106  Plaintiff 
argued that his disclosures were protected under the whistleblower 
provisions of the SOX, which, by extension, are incorporated into the 
protections afforded to whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank.107  
Ultimately, the court held for the plaintiff, analyzing the text of 
the statute to reach its conclusion.  The court reasoned that it is 
“apparent from the wording and positioning of § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) 
that Congress intended that an employee terminated for reporting 
Sarbanes-Oxley violations to a supervisor or an outside compliance 
officer, and ultimately to the SEC, have a private right of action under 
Dodd-Frank whether or not [the employee reports the violation to the 
SEC].”108 
In Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, the Southern District of New York 
evaluated the two interpretations of the Act and concluded that 
although both were permissible, neither was mandatory.109  The court 
 
 104  Id. at 155. 
 105  See, e.g., Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (“The contradictory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are best 
harmonized by reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)’s protection of certain 
whistleblower disclosures not requiring reporting to the SEC as a narrow exception 
to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)’s definition of a whistleblower as one who reports to the 
SEC.”). 
 106  Ellington v. Giacomakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 43 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 107  Id. 
 108  See id. at 45.  
 109  Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *3–4 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013). 
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also used the “existence of these ‘competing, plausible interpretations’ 
of the statutory provisions as clear evidence that ‘the statutory text is 
ambiguous in conveying Congress’s intent.’”110  The court considered 
multiple factors in reaching its conclusion: the trend in recent case 
law; the basic tools of statutory construction; and the SEC’s 
promulgated rules.  The court reasoned that “the SEC’s rule clarifies 
an ambiguous statutory scheme . . . and reflects the considerable 
experience and expertise that the agency has acquired over time with 
respect to interpretation and enforcement of the securities laws,” and 
ultimately sided with the broad interpretation of a whistleblower as also 
including employees that raise violations internally to a supervisor.111 
In Bussing v. COR Clearing LLC, the District Court for the District 
of Nebraska held that a whistleblower who reported violations to the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)112 was protected 
under Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation provision.113  Bussing brought suit 
against her former employer, Legent Clearing (now COR Clearing), 
after being fired for preparing a report, in response to a document 
request from FINRA, that alleged Legent violated the Bank Secrecy Act 
and anti-money laundering provisions.114  The court held that the 
plaintiff’s disclosures to FINRA qualified as a disclosure subject to the 
jurisdiction of the SEC and therefore entitled plaintiff to protection 
under subsection (iii) of the Anti-Retaliation provision.115  The court 
refused to apply the definition of “whistleblower” found in 5 U.S.C. 
§78u-6(a)(6) to the Anti-Retaliation provision, reasoning that a strict 
reading of the text would undermine Dodd-Frank’s overall purpose.116  
The court argued: 
When it is apparent that Congress intended a word to be 
given its ordinary meaning, notwithstanding the presence of 
a statutory definition to the contrary, and when applying the 
definition to the provision at issue would defeat that 
provision’s purpose, the Court will not mechanically read the 
statutory definition into that provision.117 
 
 110  Id. at *5. 
 111  Id. at *7.  
 112  FINRA is a non-governmental entity that acts as a self-regulatory organization 
and regulates trading of equities, corporate bonds, securities futures, and options.  
 113  Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 740 (D. Neb. 2014). 
 114  Id. at 723–25.  
 115  Id. at 730. 
 116  Id. (“Nor is it logical to conclude that Congress intended to encourage an 
across-the-board departure from the general practice of first making an internal 
report.”). 
 117  Id. at 729.  
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Rejecting the statutory definition, the court instead used the 
everyday definition of a whistleblower as “a person who tells police, 
reporters, etc., about something (such as a crime) that has been kept 
secret, or an employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a 
governmental or law-enforcement agency.”118  Unless the term 
“whistleblower” is given its ordinary meaning for purposes of the Anti-
Retaliation provision, subsection (iii) will be rendered insignificant, 
and its purpose—to shield a broad range of employee disclosures—will 
be thwarted.119 
iii. A Minority of Courts Have Held That the Text of Dodd-
Frank Unambiguously States a Whistleblower Under 
the Act is an Individual or Individuals Who Report 
Securities Violations to the SEC 
Until the recent Second Circuit decision in Berman, the Fifth 
Circuit was the only circuit court to rule on the question of whether 
the SEC’s interpretation is entitled to judicial deference.  In July 2013, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found no ambiguity in 
the Act’s qualifications for a whistleblower and, thus, refused to follow 
the SEC’s regulations.120  The court also declined to follow the trend in 
several district court decisions that had found internal reports to be 
protected.121  The Fifth Circuit issued a decision in Asadi v. G.E. Energy 
(USA), LLC, holding that, to be a “whistleblower” under the SEC’s 
whistleblower program, an employee must provide information 
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the SEC.122 
In Asadi, the plaintiff worked for GE Energy’s Iraq Country 
Executive.  After witnessing practices that he believed violated the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the plaintiff reported the issue 
to both of his supervisors, but did not raise any complaints to the 
SEC.123  Shortly after his complaint, Asadi received a “surprisingly 
negative” performance review, and his supervisors pressured him to 
step down from his position.  Ultimately, the plaintiff was fired, 
prompting him to file suit alleging that GE Energy violated the SEC 
whistleblower protections of Dodd-Frank.124  Asadi asserted that he was 
 
 118  Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).  
 119  Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 729. 
 120  Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 121  See Catherine Foti, When is A ‘Whistleblower’ Not Really A Whistleblower?, FORBES 
(Aug. 7, 2013, 11:22 AM),http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/08/07/ 
when-is-a-whistleblower-not-really-a-whistleblower/. 
 122  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.  
 123  Id. at 621.  
 124  Id. 
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a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank and argued that the Anti-
Retaliation section, on its face, did not require disclosure of 
information to the SEC.125 
The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s claim, ruling that he was 
not a “whistleblower” because he did not report a violation of the 
securities laws to the SEC.126  The court also held that plaintiff’s internal 
reporting of potential FCPA violations did not fall within the Anti-
Retaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Act because he could not 
show that his internal disclosures of alleged corrupt actions were 
protected or required by the terms of the FCPA.127  The protections the 
Anti-Retaliation provision offers, the court explained, extend only to 
individuals who meet the external reporting requirements of the 
Definitions section; “the latter section merely describes a set of 
protected activities for individuals who have already achieved 
whistleblower status by reporting to the SEC.”128  The court focused on 
the word “whistleblower” in the Anti-Retaliation section and argued 
that, had Congress intended this section to provide protections for all 
individuals making internal disclosures, it would have used the term 
“individual” or “employee” rather than “whistleblower.”  Instead of 
reading subsection (iii) as expanding the definition of a Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower, subsection (iii) merely “expands protection for those 
who report both to the SEC and internally.”129 
In deciding to follow this narrow definition, the Fifth Circuit also 
considered how the broad definition of whistleblower would implicate 
SOX if it were controlling law.  If all SOX-protected activity fell under 
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions, then regardless of whether the 
employee provided information to the SEC, all SOX claimants could 
arguably file a whistleblower retaliation claim under Dodd-Frank and 
circumvent SOX altogether.130  This means that a plaintiff could raise 
any SOX issue under Dodd-Frank and take advantage of a longer 
statute of limitations, a direct right of action in federal district court, 
and nearly double monetary damages.  Such a construction would, 
according to the Fifth Circuit, render SOX obsolete.131 
 
 
 125  Id. at 624.  
 126  Id. at 630.  
 127  Id.  
 128  Leifer, supra note 53, at 137 (citing Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626).  
 129  Alison Frankel, Appeals Court Restricts Dodd-Frank Protection for Whistle-Blowers, 
REUTERS (July 18, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/07/18/ 
appeals-court-restricts-dodd-frank-protection-for-whistle-blowers/.  
 130  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628. 
 131  Id.  
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Unfortunately, the courts have only further muddled the question 
of who qualifies for Dodd-Frank whistleblower protection.  The courts 
“are all over the place . . . . Unless you’re in the Fifth Circuit, there’s 
no consensus.”132  Yet even the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is not entirely 
persuasive and leaves certain aspects of the issue unresolved.  Under 
Asadi, reporting a securities law violation to the SEC is an absolute 
prerequisite to Dodd-Frank protection.133  Subsection (iii), according 
to the Asadi reasoning, simply prohibits employers from taking 
retaliatory action against a whistleblower for any further reporting.  
But this conclusion ignores the bigger picture of Dodd-Frank within 
the context of broader securities-law framework, “particularly the 
internal reporting processes that Congress has previously 
established.”134  Dodd-Frank aims to improve the accountability and 
transparency of the financial system.  Adopting the broad definition of 
a whistleblower avoids “disincentivizing individuals from reporting 
internally first in appropriate circumstances.”135  According to a study 
by the Ethics Resource Center, eighty-four percent of whistleblowers 
attempt to report their concerns internally and only turn to outside 
authorities with compliance violations when their internal complaints 
go unheeded.136  Companies want their employees to first report 
alleged legal violations internally so that they can investigate the 
allegation; decide whether there is a violation; and determine whether 
they can defend against the allegation, identify any wrongdoers, and 
remediate the situation.137  Yet employers may find it difficult to 
encourage employees to use the company’s reporting systems if 
employees understand that internal whistleblowing is not protected 
conduct. 
 
 
 132  Ben James, 5 Questions Weighing on Whistleblower Lawyers in 2015, LAW360 (Jan. 
13, 2015, 3:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/607911/5-questions-weighing-
on-whistleblower-lawyers-in-2015 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 133  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630. 
 134  The 1995 amendment to the 1934 Act, imposing a series of internal company 
disclosure obligations on registered public accounting firms, coupled with the 2002 
enactment of SOX, imposing additional requirements for internal company reporting 
of wrongdoing, underscore Congress’ intent to increase corporate transparency.  SEC, 
Amicus Brief II, supra note 84, at 33.  
 135  SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 28 (citing Proposed Rules for 
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70500 (Nov. 17, 2010)).  
 136  Christopher M. Matthews, Most Whistleblowers Report Internally, Study Finds, WSJ 
BLOGS (May 30, 2012, 9:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/05/30/most-whistleblowers-report-internally-study-finds/.  
 137  Id.  
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In support of the narrow definition of a whistleblower, the Asadi 
court argued that the broad interpretation would make SOX 
irrelevant.  The court reasoned that the broad interpretation would 
render a private cause of action under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806, 
“for practical purposes, moot.”138  But this statement ignores the 
advantages of bringing a SOX claim over a Dodd-Frank claim in certain 
situations.  First, a SOX claim is more suitable for a plaintiff seeking to 
avoid litigation costs and to stay out of courtrooms.  SOX claims, unlike 
claims brought under Dodd-Frank, are heard in an administrative 
forum at the Department of Labor (DOL).  DOL also “assumes 
responsibility for investigating the retaliation claim and preparing the 
evidence for an administrative law judge’s review.”139  Under certain 
circumstances, SOX can also provide for a greater financial reward 
than a claim under Dodd-Frank.  Unlike Dodd-Frank, SOX provides 
for “all relief necessary to make the employee whole” and for 
“compensation for any special damages.”140  This language has been 
held to authorize compensation for emotional distress and 
reputational harm.141  This option will be best for individuals who have 
suffered significant emotional harm. 
Asadi also held that the broad interpretation of “whistleblower” 
would render the words “to the Commission” in the Definitions section 
superfluous.142  The same argument, however, can be flipped to argue 
that the words “to the Commission” in (ii) and (iii) are superfluous if 
the narrow interpretation is adopted.  If a whistleblower is, by 
definition, already an individual who reports to the SEC, why repeat 
“to the Commission” in (ii) and (iii)?  “Surely Congress could have 
been more explicit and more direct if it in fact intended to protect only 
those disclosures that involve securities law violations, and only if the 
employee has made a separate disclosure to the Commission.”143 
 
 
 
 
 138  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628. 
 139  SEC, Amicus Brief II, supra note 84. 
 140  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1) & (c)(2)(C) (2012). 
 141  See e.g., Rutherford v. Jones Lang Lasalle Am., Inc., No. 12-14422, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 116872, at *14 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013) (holding that ”the language of SOX’s 
remedy provision, analogous whistleblower statutes and decisions of the ARB support 
the recovery of damages under SOX for emotional distress, mental anguish, 
humiliation and injury to reputation”). 
 142  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628.  
 143  SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 21. 
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IV. COURTS CAN USE THE CHEVRON TEST TO RESOLVE DODD-FRANK’S 
AMBIGUOUS WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION 
Candidly, there are strong arguments for both the narrow and the 
broad interpretation of the word “whistleblower” under Dodd-Frank.  
Perhaps this is why courts have held for both sides of the issue.  The 
ambiguity lies in the fact that both definitions, narrow and broad, are 
supported by the text of the statute.144  On the one hand, the Anti-
Retaliation provision, when read as a catch-all after carving out an 
exception to the definition of “whistleblower” in 78u-6(a), protects 
internal disclosures and other tips to agencies other than the SEC.  
Conversely, the Anti-Retaliation provision, when interpreted as a 
simple list of whistleblower protections (e.g., an individual has already 
reported a securities law violation to the SEC) raises the question of  
“why Congress [would] craft clause (iii) to [unnecessarily] suggest that 
it protects a much broader class of disclosures than it actually does?”145 
V. COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE CHEVRON TEST AND DEFER TO THE 
SEC’S INTERPRETATION 
Chevron holds that an ambiguous statute can be clarified with a 
two-part test to determine regulatory authority.146  First, the court must 
determine whether Congress has spoken directly on the question at 
issue.  If so, then the court defers to the statute.147  If Congress has not 
addressed the issue in the statute itself, then the court must determine 
whether the agency’s response to the statute is based on a “permissible” 
interpretation of the statute and defer to the agency.148  In defining 
“whistleblower,” Congress delegates power to the SEC as the 
rulemaking agency: “[t]he term ‘whistleblower’ means any individual 
who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
Commission.”149  Thus, the statute grants the SEC power to issue 
 
 144  Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *13–14 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013). 
 145  SEC, Amicus Brief II, supra note 84, at 20. 
 146  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 147  If Congress has spoken directly on the issue, “the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”  Id. at 842–43. 
 148  Id. at 843.  “Permissible” encompasses any interpretation that is not 
unreasonable.  Essentially, courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation unless that 
interpretation is irrational.  See Orrin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical 
Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 149  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2015) (emphasis added).  
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regulations relating to the manner in which information may be 
reported under the Act.150 
A. Congress Has Not Spoken Directly to the Issue of Whether a 
Whistleblower Must Report a Securities Violation to the SEC 
The statute’s text provides little help in determining Congress’ 
intent behind subsection (iii) of the Anti-Retaliation provision, as it 
was not included in the statute until very late in the drafting process.  
In fact, the language of subsection (iii) only first appeared in the base 
conference committee draft that the Senate, in May 2010, approved 
for use in the Dodd-Frank conference committee.151  It was not 
included in the bill that passed the House in December 2009, nor in 
the version that passed the Senate in May 2010, and there is no hint as 
to why the language was added to that draft.152  Furthermore, the 
majority of the committee reports and debates in Congress focus on 
the bounty provisions of the Act and “contain very few substantive 
discussions of its anti-retaliation provisions.”153  Of the minimal reports 
that discuss the Anti-Retaliation provision, “none touch upon the issue 
of whether reporting to the SEC is required for whistleblowers to avail 
themselves of the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions.”154  Analysis of the 
legislative history does little more than suggest that Congress was not 
aware of any potential conflict when they included subsection (iii).155 
 
 
 
 
 
 150  See id.  
 151  The provision first appeared in the base conference committee draft that the 
Senate, in May 2010, approved for use in the Dodd-Frank conference committee.  See 
H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 922(a) (conference base text).  
 152  This section was not included either in the original version of the bill that 
passed the House, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7203(a) (as passed Dec. 11, 2009), nor 
was it included in the version that initially passed the Senate, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
§ 922(a) (as passed May 20, 2010). 
 153  See Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011) (“The legislative history of [Dodd-Frank] provides little 
evidence of Congress’s purpose [regarding the Anti-Retaliation provision].  The 
various committee reports and debates in Congress focus on the bounty provisions of 
the Act and contain very few substantive discussions of its anti-retaliation provisions.  
Of those few, none touch upon the issue of whether reporting to the SEC is required 
for whistleblowers to avail themselves of the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions.”). 
 154  Id.  
 155  Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 731 (D. Neb. 2014) (“The 
official record contains only fleeting references to the anti-retaliation provision.”). 
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B. The SEC’s Regulation Clarifying the Statute is a Reasonable 
Interpretation for Chevron Purposes 
The second prong of the Chevron test is “whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”156  The 
SEC maintains that its interpretation is reasonable because it: (1) 
“effectuates the broad employment anti-retaliation protections that 
clause (iii) contemplates”; (2) it “avoid[s] disincentivizing individuals 
from reporting internally first in appropriate circumstances”; (3) SEC 
experience indicates “that if internal compliance and reporting 
procedures ‘are not utilized or working, our system of securities 
regulation will be less effective’”; and (4) “it enhances the 
Commission’s ability to bring enforcement actions when employers 
take adverse employment actions against employees for reporting 
securities law violations internally.”157 
The SEC’s position, from a public policy standpoint, “is more in 
accordance with the overall objective of securities law enforcement, 
which is to encourage reporting.”158  As the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce recognizes in its public comments, “internal reporting 
mechanisms are cornerstones of effective compliance policies because 
they permit companies to discover instances of potential wrongdoing, 
to investigate underlying facts and to take remedial action,” in turn 
helping to create a strong culture of integrity and deter future 
misconduct.159  Reporting internally should always be preferable for a 
business organization, as it helps organizations detect fraud from the 
inside,160 thereby avoiding substantial future litigation costs or bad 
publicity.  A whistleblower that reports directly to the SEC “may bypass 
internal compliance completely, depriving a company of an 
opportunity to investigate and remedy potential wrongdoing before 
regulators get involved—and depriving them of the possibility that 
regulators might never need to become involved.”161  If internal 
 
 156  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984).  
 157  SEC, Amicus Brief, supra note 15, at 28–29 (citing to Proposed Rules for 
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70500 (Nov. 17, 2010)). 
 158   Alexander, supra note 85, at 284. 
 159  Jordan A. Thomas & Vanessa De Simone, Opinion: Employers May Come to Regret 
Seeking Narrow Definition of ‘Whistleblower,’ THE NAT’L L J. (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1397049044573/Opinion-Employers-May-
Come-to-Regret-Seeking-Narrow-Definition-of-
Whistleblower?slreturn=20160114214914.  
 160  Alexander, supra note 85, at 284.  
 161  Foti, supra note 121. 
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reporting is not covered by Dodd-Frank, it encourages reporting to the 
government and undermines internal compliance programs, and 
could lead to costly and embarrassing regulatory issues.  As a result, 
“[t]his decreases the effectiveness of compliance programs by 
reducing the number of employees willing to utilize internal reporting 
mechanisms.”162 
The SEC’s rule utilizes corporate compliance departments to 
streamline the whistleblowing process and make it more effective.  The 
number of whistleblower tips is only expected to rise and the entire 
process will become more productive if the SEC can share some of the 
responsibility with the companies of the reporting employees.163  In 
fiscal year 2012, the SEC had only fourteen employees administering a 
whistleblower program that generated 3,001 tips and required the 
SEC’s staff to return over 3,050 telephone calls.164  Policing and 
enforcing securities laws will be more effective if the SEC and 
compliance groups can work together.165 
The SEC’s rule clarifies the ambiguity over who exactly qualifies 
as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower without undermining the goals of the 
Act.  Until the Supreme Court can rule on the issue, the Chevron test 
can be used to defer to the SEC’s reasonable interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162  Shannon Kay Quigley, Whistleblower Tug-Of-War: Corporate Attempts to Secure 
Internal Reporting Procedures in the Face of External Monetary Incentives Provided by the Dodd-
Frank Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 269 (2012) (citation omitted).  
 163  Id. at 272.  
 164  Foti, supra note 121. 
 165  Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It has been over five years since Congress enacted Dodd-Frank 
and we have yet to find a clear understanding of the whistleblower 
provision.  Courts in the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have held that Dodd-Frank protects internal 
whistleblowers.166  Courts in the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits have held the opposite.167  Even more troubling, judges in two 
district courts—Colorado and the Northern District of California—
disagree as to whether internal complaints are protected.168  Until 
either the courts or legislature clarify which tipsters are eligible for 
whistleblower status, Dodd-Frank cannot reach its full potential of 
uncovering and reprimanding securities law violators. 
 
 
 166  Michael Filoromo, III, SDNY Widens Split on Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Protection, 
LAW 360 (Dec. 18, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/602937/sdny-
widens-split-on-dodd-frank-whistleblower-protection. 
 167  Id.  
 168  Id.  
